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Abstract
Since its advent in 2012, CRISPR has spawned a cottage industry of bioethics literature. One principal criticism of
the technology is its virtually instant widespread adoption prior to deliberative bodies conducting a meaningful
ethical review of its harms and benefits—a violation, to some, of bioethics’ ‘‘precautionary principle.’’ This view
poorly considers, however, the role that the law can play—and does, in fact, play—in policing the introduction of
ethically problematic uses of the technology. This Perspective recounts these legal regimes, including regulatory
agencies and premarket approval, tort law and deterrence, patents and ethical licenses, funding agencies and
review boards, as well as local politics. Identifying these legal regimes and connecting them to the precautionary
principle should be instructive for bioethicists and policy makers who wish to conduct ethical reviews of new
applications of CRISPR prior to their introduction.
Introduction
CRISPR—the cheap, easy, flexible, and programma-
ble genome-editing technology—has, since its advent
in 2012, defined an entire subfield of molecular biol-
ogy, produced thousands of technical papers describing
its myriad applications, and—as here—even inspired its
own journal. It has also spawned a cottage industry of
bioethics literature, with commentators raising concerns
that CRISPR will harmfully alter the evolution of spe-
cies,1 usher in an era of ‘‘designer babies,’’2 and revive
extinct animals, among other applications.3 To analyze
the potential ethical import of these applications, sev-
eral bioethics associations, such as the Association for
Responsible Research and Innovation in Genome Editing
(ARRIGE), announced in this journal’s second issue,
have been established to ‘‘address multiple issues raised
by genome-editing technologies used in research and ap-
plications within a safe and ethical framework for indi-
viduals and society.’’4 Since 2015, scientific academies
and government agencies have issued more than 60
‘‘official reports’’ about the ethics of CRISPR.5
While the literature is varied, the general thrust of
many of these analyses is the difficulty of controlling
ethically problematic uses of CRISPR. Without increased
‘‘oversight’’ of the technology, many commentators have
raised the possibilities of CRISPR contributing to an
exacerbation of health inequities,6 a diminishment of
human dignity,7 and an ossification of technological deter-
minism.2 To that end, a fair amount of bioethics scholarship
on CRISPR has called for a reinvigoration of the ‘‘precau-
tionary principle’’: a temporary moratorium on certain ap-
plications of the technology, as a precaution, until such
harms can be reasonably safeguarded against.8 The impli-
cation of these calls is that whatever laws currently serve
to regulate CRISPR, the technology is so profoundly trans-
formative that the law cannot adequately police it.
This article takes a different view of the state of the
law in regards to CRISPR. A variety of currently existing
legal regimes can—and do—control the research and
development of CRISPR in ways that robustly further
the precautionary principle. Regulatory agencies, such
as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), have
the power to forbid commercial applications of new bio-
technologies, such as CRISPR, without prior, stringent
proof of safety and efficacy. Tort regimes, as in other
contexts, act as deterrents against negligent applications
of the technology. Patents and patent licenses can—and
are—being used to tamp down on ethically question-
able uses of the technology. Funding agencies similarly
have significant oversight concerning how the technology
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is used in publicly funded research settings. And, lastly,
there is always local politics—democratic restrictions
on ethically difficult uses of the technology in certain
locations.
As radical as CRISPR may be, currently existing laws
and regulations do, in fact, serve to prevent its riskiest
excesses, squarely in line with the precautionary principle.
To the extent the prescriptive suggestions of bioethics lit-
erature on CRISPR call for further application of the pre-
cautionary principle, these legal regimes can be used as
they currently stand, without crafting new layers of over-
sight. This article provides a broad overview of these
legal regimes—how they operate and how they serve to
guard against many of the risks currently prevalent in
the bioethics literature surrounding CRISPR. And while
this article focuses primarily on the United States, simi-
lar regimes outside of the United States are likely to
apply as well.
Premarket Approval and Regulatory Agencies
One of the principal criticisms of CRISPR in the bioeth-
ics literature centers on its reinforcement of ‘‘technolog-
ical determinism’’: that if an application of technology is
technically feasible, its adoption is fait accompli.2,9,10 As
applied to CRISPR, this risks using the technology in
ways that are unethical, unsafe, or threaten the public
weal simply because they are possible. The recent exper-
iments on human embryos by He Jiankui, resulting in the
birth of two children in China with CRISPR-mediated ge-
netic modifications, serve as perhaps the strongest warn-
ing on the dangers of such an approach.2 To guard against
such an ‘‘inexorable tide’’ of technological advance,11 a
number of bioethicists have suggested a reinvigoration
of the precautionary principle, especially as it concerns
using CRISPR for therapeutic purposes. This has famously
included a call for a temporary global moratorium on
human germline modification using CRISPR by some of
the technology’s most celebrated scientists.12
Here, as elsewhere, the animating principle behind calls
for more robust precautionary approaches is that current
laws and regulations are not up to the task of assessing
the safety of new applications of CRISPR before they
become prevalent in the marketplace. Given CRISPR’s
global reach, this includes concerns even with adequate do-
mestic laws to prohibit such work, the world will succumb
to a technological race to the bottom, with different coun-
tries facilitating the very work others find ethically problem-
atic. In truth, however, such assessments are precisely the
function of the variety of overlapping regulatory agencies
that currently oversee different aspects of CRISPR. For
human therapies, of course, the FDA and its international
counterparts, such as the European Medicines Agency,
oversee the introduction of virtually all new drugs and bio-
logical products into commerce. Given the breadth of the
statute giving power to the FDA, the agency’s authority in
the area is immensely broad and, when vigorously enforced,
extremely powerful.13 The FDA has stated itself that it
considers a variety of uses of CRISPR to fall within its ju-
risdiction.14 And while the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) has allowed certain CRISPR crops to reach shelves
without a premarket review, it has nonetheless made clear
that such crops are subject to its continuing oversight, in-
cluding its Plant Protection and Quarantine program.15
These authorities are, ultimately, precautionary in
nature. In the human context, developers of CRISPR
therapies are prohibited from publicly introducing their
products prior to a robust demonstration of their safety
and efficacy.14 Contrary to the notion that such approv-
als are inevitable—and thus traffic on the notion of
CRISPR’s technological determinism—many applications
for new biological products fail. This includes technolo-
gies that, like CRISPR, ignite great promise among scien-
tists and the public alike. Non-CRISPR-based gene
therapies had been repeatedly rejected by the FDA for
decades, for example, despite their immense promise in
treating genetic disease.16 The FDA has also continu-
ously rejected applications for stem-cell therapies, de-
spite the public’s decades-long fascination with them.17
And after being the subject of the 2006 Nobel Prize in
Physiology and Medicine, the FDA only recently ap-
proved the first therapy making use of RNA interference
(RNAi) technology.18 If the FDA is anything, it is the
legal embodiment of the precautionary principle.
It is true, of course, that the FDA’s jurisdiction, while
broad, extends only to assessments of therapies’ safety or
efficacy. The agency does not, at least formally, consider
the public-health impacts of such technologies, how they
will be economically distributed, or whether they will
be used ethically once approved19—all risks that a pre-
cautionary approach may well avoid. But this does not
mean that a robust new layer of oversight is needed to
put such precautions into practice. First, while the FDA
has little power to prevent the introduction of novel tech-
nologies solely on public-health, economic, or ethical
grounds, the reality is that such concerns frequently over-
lap, in practice, with safety and efficacy issues, the agen-
cy’s core competence.19 The FDA has significant power,
for example, to narrow a therapy’s approved medical
indication—an important touchstone, in many instances,
for whether insurance reimbursement is available.20 And
any new technology that poses public-health risks writ
large are also likely to pose safety and efficacy risks
too.19 Second, despite limits to its authority, the FDA




























































concerning the effects of its decisions on public-health
and distributional consequences.19 Moving such author-
ity away from agencies such as the FDA in the name
of additional oversight may cut such critical dialogue
short. And third, the FDA’s technical expertise in new
biotechnologies puts it in a supreme position to address
many of the risks sought to be guarded against with the pre-
cautionary principle. Commenting on the FDA’s expertise
in this area in the aftermath of the He experiments, Charo
noted that the agency had ‘‘the most obvious opportunities
to shape the direction of research and applications . can
impose the most stringent standards of proof for safety,
multigenerational stability, and efficacy of edits before
even considering an application for beginning clinical tri-
als; [and] can also limit review to edits of genomic sites as-
sociated with particularly onerous medical conditions.’’21
Whatever their shortcomings, regulatory agencies, such
as the FDA and the USDA, and others outside the United
States, are ultimately responsible for putting the precau-
tionary principle into legal practice.
Tort Law and Deterrence
Beyond regulatory agencies, there is tort law—typically,
the civil, monetary redress of harms caused by the negli-
gence of others. This includes products liability actions,
cases concerned with defective products or inadequate
services that harm their users physically or economically.
As applied to CRISPR, this means that those injured
by the negligent use of the technology could, at least in
the United States, sue to redress their harms.
At first blush, the tort regime seems to run orthogonal
to the precautionary principle. Tort redress appears to be
post hoc rather than precautionary. And this is precisely
the concern expressed by many bioethicists about the na-
ture CRISPR as a technology. Because CRISPR is cheap,
easy, and readily available, its risks are not well con-
tained in the way that risks from larger more institutional
projects are. Mitigating harms after widespread deploy-
ment of a new technology is famously inefficient.22
But tort law is grounded in deterrence not merely dis-
tribution.23 Tort liability, done well, should strike enough
fear into the hearts of a technology’s users to ensure that
the technology is used safely, ethically, and responsi-
bly.24 In that sense, a well-oiled tort regime is well
aligned with the precautionary principle: it seeks to
deter, absent sufficient precautions, unsafe uses of a tech-
nology. And indeed, tort judgments have changed numer-
ous technological and medical practices heralded in the
bioethics canon.25 Further, one of the criticisms of the tort
regime is that it may, as a deterrent, go too far, chilling
the adoption of beneficial biotechnologies simply for fear
of threat from suit.
The tort regime has more to commend to it than simply
this fear. Aside from punitive monetary judgments, tort
law also contemplates injunctions—a court order outright
forbidding a particular practice because it has found be to
harmful or likely to be harmful. More simply put, the
tort regime allows judges—after weighing the appropri-
ate evidence—to bar a certain activity from occurring
because it is unethical, unsafe, or otherwise harmful. Often-
times, these injunctions—while only applying the parties
in the litigation—compel others to follow suit. This is not
altogether different from panels of experts weighing in
on the import of a new technology, as they are currently
being collected for CRISPR.26 Some injunctions even
operate before a trial has been completed—preliminary
injunctions—that, above all else, seek to ‘‘preserve the
status quo.’’27 Like premarket approvals in the regula-
tory context, preliminary injunctions for torts can work
as precautions.
Patents and Ethical Licenses
Similar to tort judgments, patents—at least, ideally—can
be harnessed to drive the precautionary principle as well.
As the axiom goes, patents are the right to exclude, that
is, prevent: they allow their owners to prohibit others
from practicing the claimed technology without prior per-
mission. That is not a by-product of patent law; they are,
contrary to much misconception, patents’ only power.
The power can be an extraordinarily economically pow-
erful one—one of the explanations for the viral interest
in patents covering CRISPR. Famously, the University
of California and the Broad Institute fought over founda-
tion aspects of the CRISPR-Cas9 patents precisely because
of their perceived economic returns.28 The winner—still
not entirely clear—will possess immense power, both
legal and economic, to prohibit others from practicing
the technology.
Those seeking to use patented technology may obtain
permission from a patent holder to do so; this constitutes
a license. Licenses, although permissive by nature, may
be used to restrict others in limited ways, such as per-
forming unethical research. And licenses, especially for
biotechnology, are often global in nature. This is precisely
the Broad Institute’s practice with respect to its CRISPR pat-
ents. It prohibits licensees from using its technology in ways
that it has deemed unethical, namely to conduct human germ-
line editing experiments and to conduct certain research on to-
bacco.29 While such licenses can last only as long as the
patent is valid, this ‘‘ethical licensing’’ approach is ultimately
a form of the precautionary principle: a legal restriction
on uses that are deemed dangerous or societally harmful.
Aside from the cooperative nature of licenses, there
is also the threat of patent infringement suits against



























































recalcitrant users—the threat of suing those who use the
technology unethically. Often, such suits come with
injunctions prohibiting the patented use in question—
further serving the model of prohibiting unethical users
before they are widely spread. This is, in fact, the
model proposed by Kevin Esvelt to rein in gene drive,
an application of CRISPR to ‘‘drive’’ certain alleles
through populations that have sparked heated ethical con-
cerns.30 The threat of infringement—the threat of hal-
ing proponents of unethical uses of the technology into
a courtroom—is also a legal demonstration of the pre-
cautionary principle. In the words of Antonio Regalado,
such approaches are meant to ‘‘stop gene spills before
they happen.’’30
Funding Agencies and Review Boards
Prior to the commercialization of technologies—when
they are typically still basic research—government fund-
ing agencies also play a critical legal role in furthering
the precautionary principle. Several public agencies—
the National Institutes of Health, in particular—require
researchers to seek prior committee approval before be-
ginning their experiments. Such committee approvals—
the alphabet-soup review boards—typically center on
the safety and ethical safeguards of experiments. This
includes, of course, Institutional Review Boards to con-
duct ‘‘ethical reviews’’ of any proposed experiments31;
Institutional Biosafety Committees to consider, in ad-
dition to its safety mandate, ‘‘ethical principles’’ with
which experiments are to be conducted32; and, for animal
research, an Institutional Animal Care and Use Commit-
tee similarly to review the ‘‘ethical necessity’’ of engaging
in such research.33 Failing reviews of such committees
generally prohibit such experiments from being car-
ried out—at least in their described form—by appli-
cants. There are similar funding schemes—with expert
oversight—in Europe and elsewhere.
Here, too, these reviews function much like a deliber-
ative body of experts—and in most cases are, indeed,
convened by experts—to pass on the ethical ambit of
such experiments prior to them being conducted. In the
context of CRISPR, CRISPR experiments can—and
do—undergo such reviews, with several CRISPR exper-
iments stopped because of ethical and safety con-
cerns.34 If the goal of the precautionary principle is,
indeed, precaution—rather than outright moratorium—
the ongoing oversight of such committees at least provi-
des a forum for such a principle to operate.
Politics and Prohibition
Lastly, there is always local politics—that is, small-D
democratic participation in state and municipal govern-
ment to prohibit certain activities from occurring in con-
stituents’ backyards. Such daggers have famously been
wielded to prohibit certain research from being con-
ducted, ostensibly on ethical grounds—notably, the Cam-
bridge City Council’s 1976 six-month moratorium on
research involving recombinant DNA, after significant
and contentious public hearings.35 Perhaps less well
known is that similar restrictions on research were also
enacted at the state level—New York and Maryland—
as well as the towns of Princeton, Amherst, Waltham,
Berkeley, and Emeryville.35
Local participation in such governance—lauded by
notable bioethicists—has found its way, again, to police
certain uses of CRISPR. Efforts to use one form of
CRISPR, ‘‘gene drive,’’ to control the pest species, like
the white-footed deer mouse and vector mosquitoes, have
come under significant local scrutiny specifically in Mar-
tha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts, and Key West, Florida.36
In those cases, public discomfort with such uses is one
of the principal reasons they have not been widely
deployed. In a similar although much more controver-
sial vein, democratic action—such as the 2015 anti-
GMO protests in France—have been used essentially to
prevent the market introduction of novel biotechnologies.
In this sense, the legal power of local government is a
true democratic implementation of the precautionary
principle. Further, as with the case in France, local
democratic action can lead to national policy to ban or
otherwise make unattractive the use of contentious tech-
nologies. Whether such interventions are ultimately sci-
entifically (or ethically) sound remains to be seen. But
such measures prove that the precautionary principle is
alive and well in local legislation.
Conclusion
Contrary to the notion that widespread use of CRISPR
is fait accompli and thus not subject to meaningful ethics
reviews that embody the precautionary principle, a di-
verse and broad fabric of legal regimes, mostly domestic
but some international, has the capacity to slow, and in
some cases prevent, the introduction of CRISPR technol-
ogies without certain precautions. Bioethicists and pol-
icy makers who are otherwise interested in conducting
ethical assessments of CRISPR ‘‘before it’s too late’’
would do well to consider these in further detail. This
is not to say that such regimes are perfectly precautionary—
far from it. But even if they only imperfectly capture eth-
ical concerns over the adoption of the technology, they go
a long way in policing some of the most serious ‘‘rogue’’
applications.21 Like CRISPR itself, the law has a great
many applications; its capacity is limited only to that
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